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Florida Law Review, Vol. 9, Iss. 1 [1956], Art. 3

THE PUBLIC OFFICER-PUBLIC EMPLOYEE

DISTINCTION IN FLORIDA
H. 0. WALDBY*
In the spring of 1930 J. W. Buchanan, a convicted murderer, anxiously awaited a Florida Supreme Court decision on the distinction
between a public officer and a public employee. For that technical legal
decision would determine whether anyone could carry out the warrant
for his execution. If the superintendent of the prison were declared
a public officer, his appointment by a board rather than by the Governor was in violation of the Florida Constitution and he could not order
the electrocution of Buchanan.
The Supreme Court of Florida has frequently found it necessary
to attempt to define "public office" and "public employment." Justice Elwyn Thomas accurately stated, "It is not simple to define precisely employee and officer or to distinguish between them." 2 In
other cases the Court has minimized the difficulty of distinguishing
between the two. 3 The distinctive characteristics of an office and an
employment may appear at first glance to be minutely technical and
of little consequence except to legal scholars or to lawyers infrequently
involved in a case in which the subject is in controversy. A close study
of the relevant cases and statutes, however, reveals that the distinction
has had a pronounced effect upon trends in the government of Florida.
More important than the distinction itself, perhaps, is the fact that
courts have felt it necessary to establish criteria of distinction that
have influenced the organization and structure of state government.
THE CoNsTTUToNAL DISTINCrION
The Florida Constitution does not define the terms "officer" and
"employee," but provides rules applicable to offices and officers that
*A.B. 1940, University of Oklahoma; M.S. 1941, Oklahoma Agricultural and
Mechanical College; Ph.D. 1950, University of Michigan; Author of The Patronage
System in Oklahoma, Philippine Public Fiscal Administration, and articles on
state government; Associate Professor, School of Public Administration, Florida
State University.
'Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fla. 1202, 131 So. 151 (1930).

2Palmer v. State ex rel. Axleroad, 149 Fla. 616, 618, 6 So.2d 550, 551 (1942).
SE.g., In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 63 So.2d 321, 325 (1953) (dictum);
State ex rel. Davis v. Botts, 101 Fla. 361, 365, 134 So. 219, 221 (1931) (dictum);

McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 97 Fla. 750, 769, 122 So. 239, 246

[471
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are not applicable to employments and employees. The Constitution
provides that the unexpired terms of a vacated office may be filled by
the Governor unless a specific statute or constitutional provision provides another method;4 that appointed and elected officers who are
not liable to impeachment may be suspended for cause by the Governor, who may fill the vacancy by appointment; 5 that state officers must
take an appropriate oath upon assuming their positions;G and that
no one may hold more than one office at one time.7 The Legislature
is forbidden to create an office that is filled for a term of longer than
four years. 8
The great majority of cases considering the distinction have dealt
with attempts of the Legislature to empower boards, elected officials,
and individuals other than the Governor to appoint executive secretaries, directors, and division heads, who may or may not be officers
within the meaning of the constitutional provision 9 that requires all
officers to be elected or appointed by the chief executive.
Legislative Skirting of GubernatorialPowers
In this state, which under the Constitution has a "cabinet system"
and therefore a plural executive, the provisions providing for appointment and suspension of officers have greatly bolstered the strength
of the Governor. In interpreting the constitutional delegation of appointive power to the Governor,' 0 the Court said: 11
"Not even the legislature can curtail the appointive power of
the Governor by requiring him to accept, or be bound by, the
advice of anyone. It was the purpose and intent to place exclusive power and responsibility for appointment of such officers
in the Governor and no one else."
(1929) (dictum).

4FLA. CONsr. art. IV, §7.
5FLA. CONsT. art. IV, §15.

6FLA. CONST. art. XVI, §2.
7FLA. CONSr. art. XVI, §15. Members of the Legislature are specifically forbidden
to hold another office. Id. art. III, §5: State ex rel. Landis v. Futch, 122 Fla. 837,
165 So. 907 (1936); Advisory Opinion to Governor, 94 Fla. 620, 113 So. 913 (1927).

SFLA. CONS?. art. XVI, §7.
9FLA. CONST. art. III, §27.
19Ibid.
"In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 63 So.2d 321, 526 (Fla. 1953).
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Even though the Senate plays a part in the suspension procedure under
the terms of the Constitution,1 2 in practice the Governor has the
dominant power.
The Legislature, conscious and wary of the Governor's extensive appointive power, has strengthened the power of individual members
of the cabinet by legislative assignment of miscellaneous duties. By
assigning duties to already existing officers, the legislators lessen the
power of the Governor's appointive hand and avoid the constitutional
problems that arise when other boards and individuals are vested with
appointive power.
Thus the Secretary of State, Attorney General, Comptroller, Treasurer, Superintendent of Public Instruction, and the Commissioner of
Agriculture have taken on many new duties and tides. The State
Treasurer serves as State Fire Marshal, State Insurance Commissioner,
Treasurer of the State Board of Administration, and is a member of
nineteen active state boards. 1 3 Obviously these functions cannot be
performed by the Treasurer individually; nor can he adequately
personally supervise the great variety of work performed under his
jurisdiction. The result is that the elective official hires employees
who necessarily have great power and discretion for which the elective
official is responsible.
The Legislature has relied greatly upon cabinet members acting
collectively as boards. There has also been an increased tendency
to appoint boards and commissions composed of laymen not otherwise connected with government. 4 The cabinet board or citizen's
commission meets periodically to formulate policy and review actions
of full-time administrative officials. Realistically speaking, the great
bulk of the work is performed and many policies are formulated by
the full-time employees of those boards and commissions.
Although this structure might be advantageous as an organizational device for maintaining the confidence of the public, it leaves
much to be desired from the standpoint of responsibility and accountability. The use of boards with full-time employees performing the
great bulk of the work also poses problems of constitutionality. If a
statute that appoints a board is to be valid, the chief administrative
12FLA. CONsr.

art. IV, §15.

13See Moalus, THE FLORIDA HANDBOOK 242-55

(1953), for a summary of member-

ship of cabinet officers on boards and commissions.
14DoYLE, LAIRD, and WEss, THE GOVERNMENT AND
(1954).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol9/iss1/3
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officer of the board must not be given any independent duties by
statute or administrative regulation, and every action he takes must
be theoretically reviewable by the board.
In order for a board to function effectively, there is necessarily a
great difference between "paper" procedure and actual practice. One
has only to attend a few board meetings and hear the perfunctory approval given past transactions and proposed future actions to recognize the truth of this statement. There are many state employees serving in almost anonymous capacities who exercise important duties, with
well-known but unknowing boards bearing responsibility.
The Problem in Existing and Proposed Legislation
Court reports are replete with cases involving the distinction between officer and employee; even more frequently the controversies
never reach the stage of adjudication but are matters of legislative
and public debate that may influence the defeat or amendment of
proposed legislation. For example, in 1955 the Governor advocated
the establishment of a Department of Finance, to be headed by a
cabinet-appointed director;15 and a bill was introduced to that effect.1 6
The President of the Senate argued, however, that the bill was clearly
unconstitutional because the director was to be appointed by the
cabinet rather than by the Governor.
A perusal of the Florida statutes reveals that strong argument
could be made that several existing statutes are violative of the Constitution because they involve positions that could be interpreted to be
offices rather than employments. For example, the director of the
State Department of Public Safety is appointed by a board composed
of the Governor and the members of the cabinet. The statute provides:1 7
"The board shall employ a director of the state department
of public safety, who shall also be the Commander of the Florida
highway patrol. The director shall set up and promulgate rules
and regulations by which the personnel of the division of the
Florida highway patrol officers shall be examined, employed
discharged, recruited, paid, and pensioned, subject to civil
...
service provisions hereafter set out."
15H.R. JouR. 10 (April 5, 1955).
16H.R. 372 (1955).
17Fa. Laws 1955, c. 29756.
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Another example is the Parole Commission, the members of which
are appointed after competitive examinations by the Board of Conmissioners of State Institutions. The Parole Commission has "power
to make such rules and regulations as it deems best for its governance,
including . .. rules of practice and procedure." 18 The Commission
also has "the powers ... of determining what persons shall be placed
on parole, and of fixing the time and the conditions-of such parole."1 9
Other instances are the appointment of the state Director of Civil
Ijefense by the state Civil Defense Council, 20 the appointment of conservation officers by the Game and Fresh Water Fish Commission, 21
the appointment of a supervisor of inspectors by the Commissioner of
Agriculture, 2 2 and the appointment of university presidents by the
23
Board of Control and the State Board of Education.
A few positions exist to which a person is appointed by the Governor either with a statutory provision that he may serve at the
pleasure of the Governor or with no provision in the statute concerning removal. If he is an employee he can be removed at will, but
if he is an officer he can be removed only for the causes listed in article
IV, section 15, of the Constitution. The Legislature very probably intended to make the director of the Beverage Department an officer;
nevertheless, after establishing his term of office, it provided, "he may
be removed at any time by the governor at the discretion of the
governor."2 4 The budget director is appointed by the Governor, but
the statute25 says nothing about his removal. It appears to be a
tossup whether he is an officer or an employee.
The 1955 Legislature provided for an extensive reorganization of
the State Road Department. 26 One of the most important provisions
was for the appointment by the road board of an executive director,
who is responsible for all records of the department, executes all contracts, and signs all vouchers.2 7 These could easily be interpreted by
the courts to be duties that can be performed only by an officer of the
state.
18FLA. STAT. §947.07 (1953).
lOFLA. STAT. §947.13 (1953).
20FLA. STAT. §252.04 (1953).
21FLA. STAT. §372.02 (1953).

22FLA. STAT. §19.47 (1953).
23FLA. STAT. §240.04 (1953).
24FLA. STAT. §561.05 (1953).
2SFLA. STAT. §216.09 (1953).
2*6F1a.

271d.

Laws 1955, c. 29965.
§12.
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The same Legislature considered other bills containing provisions
that might well have violated constitutional provisions relating to
officers. For example, several proposals were made to create a chancellor system for higher education. In some plans the Board of Control
would be abolished and the chancellor would be appointed by the
State Board of Education.2 8 Under other proposals the Board of Control would appoint a chancellor with broad powers, among which
would be the authority to prevent duplication among the schools of
higher learning.29 In either case the Legislature might run afoul of
article III, section 27, which provides that appointment of officers must
be made by the chief executive.
. JUDICIAL

TEsTS

The Supreme Court of Florida in 1868 defined an officer as a
"person commissioned or authorized to perform any public duty."30
Since that time the question of who is an officer has been considered
numerous times. 31 The procedure followed in this article will be to
analyze two important cases, State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker 32 and
365, H.R. 670 (1955).
29S. 366, H.R. 669 (1955).
3oIn re Executive Communication, 12 Fla. 651 (1868).
28S.

31E.g., the Court has held these positions to be offices: deputy sheriff, Blackburn
v. Brorein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1954); hotel and restaurant commissioner, In re
Advisory Opinion to Governor, 63 So.2d 321 (Fla. 1953); county detective, State ex
reL. Watson v. Hurlbert, 155 Fla. 531, 20 So.2d 693 (1945); city patrolman, Curry v.
Hammond, 154 Fla. 63, 16 So.2d 523 (1944); members of Board of Dental Examiners,
State ex rel. Coleman v. York, 139 Fla. 300, 190 So. 599 (1939); city clerk, State ex
rel. Gibbs v. Bloodworth, 134 Fla. 369, 184 So. 1 (1938); assistant county solicitors,
State ex rel. Davis v. Botts, 101 Fla. 361, 134 So. 219 (1931); food, drug, fertilizer
inspector, State ex reL. Woodworth v. Amos, 98 Fla. 212, 123 So. 749 (1929); county
game warden, State ex rel. Clarkson v. Philips, 70 Fla. 340, 70 So. 367 (1915); members
of Board of Control, In re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 49 Fla. 269, 89 So. 63
(1905); members of Board of Legal Examiners, State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla.
477, 22 So. 721 (1897).
The Court has held these positions to be employment: supervisors, State Beverage
Department, Schott v. Lynch, 57 So.2d 656 (Fla. 1952); superintendent of nurses,
Glendinning v. Curry, 153 Fla. 398, 14 So.2d 794 (1943); parking meter collector,
State ex rel. Dresskell v. Miami, 153 Fla. 90, 13 So.2d 707 (1943); director, State
Employment Service, State ex rel. Hathaway v. Williams, 149 Fla. 48, 5 So.2d 269
(1941); superintendent of prisons, Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fla. 1202, 131 So. 151
(1930); citrus fruit inspector, Johnson v. State ex rel. Maxcy, 99 Fla. 1311, 128 So.

853 (1930).
3239 Fla. 477, 22 So. 721 (1897).
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McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 3 and then to discuss
the various bases used by the Court in distinguishing between an
officer and an employee. These bases for distinction are included under
three headings: the exercise of a portion of sovereign power, other
standards for the distinction, and legislative intent and the presumption of legislative validity.
State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker
This is the case most frequently cited in determining the meaning
of "officer" as used in the Constitution. The Legislature in 1897
created a Board of Legal Examiners, the members of which were to
be appointed by the Supreme Court.3 4 If the members were deemed
to be officers, article III, section 27, would be violated. The law was
attacked on the additional ground of being violative of article XVI,
section 7, which provides a maximum term of four years for state
officers. The act provided that, after the expiration of the initial statutory terms, appointments for staggered terms of five years should be
made by the Court. In a well-reasoned and comprehensive opinion
the Court unanimously held that the law violated the Constitution.
The Court stated in words that have been widely quoted: 35
"The term 'office' implies a delegation of a portion of the
sovereign power to, and possession of, it by the person filling the
office, a public office being an agency for the State, and the
person whose duty it is to perform the agency being a public
officer. The term embraces the idea of tenure, duration, emolument and duties, and has respect to a permanent public trust
to be exercised in behalf of government, and not to a merely
transient, occasional or incidental employment. A person in the
service of the government who derives his position from a duly
and legally authorized election or appointment, whose duties
are continuous in their nature and defined by rules prescribed
by government, and not by contract, consisting of the exercise of
important public powers, trusts or duties, as a part of the regular administration of the government, the place and the duties
remaining, though the incumbent dies or is changed, every
3397 Fla. 750, 122 So. 239 (1929).

34Fla. Laws 1897, c. 4539.
35State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 485, 22 So. 721, 723 (1897).
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office in the constitutional meaning of the term implying an
authority to exercise some portion of the sovereign power, either
in making, executing or administering the laws."
The characteristics of an office as stated in the opinion can be restated as follows:
(1) The incumbent must exercise a portion of the sovereign
power in making, executing, or administering the laws;
(2) the duties of the position must be continuous in nature, remaining though the incumbent dies or vacates the position;
(3) the incumbent must be authorized to act by a legally recognized election or appointment;
(4) the term "office" or "officer" embraces the idea of tenure;
(5) the duties must consist of the exercise of important public
powers, trusts, or duties as a part of the regular administration of government;
(6) the duties must be legally prescribed by government and
not by contract.
McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board36
A discussion of this case has been included for two reasons. The
case discusses the relationship between an appointive board and its
chief administrative officer, and it provides an excellent example of
how the Legislature in subsequent years circumvented the decision of
the Court. In 1923 the Legislature passed an act designed to aid in tick
eradication and to provide for compulsory dipping of cattle.3S A Livestock Sanitary Board, appointed by the Governor, was directed to employ a state veterinarian. The statute, "Providing for the Employment of a State Veterinarian [and] Prescribing His... Term of Office,"
required that the veterinarian serve a four-year term of employment
under bond as the chief executive officer and secretary of the board,
which would prescribe his duties; that he could be dismissed only for
cause; and that he could appoint arbitrators to consider reasonable
costs of dipping cattle and to allocate the cost evenly between the
state and the owner in cases of disagreement. If the veterinarian
were declared an officer, that section of the law would be in violation
3697

Fla. 750, 122 So. 239 (1929).

37Fla. Laws 1923, c. 9201.
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of article III, section 27, which requires state officers to be elected or
appointed by the Governor.
The Court applied the standards set forth in the Hocker case and
concluded that the state veterinarian was an officer. In so doing the
Court discussed the relationship between the board and the adminis8
trative head employed by it.3
"As the members of the State Live Stock Sanitary Board receive no compensation for their services except for the actual
and necessary expenses paid or incurred in the discharge of
their duties, it is obvious that this body functions, as doubtless it
was contemplated they should, more as a deliberative body and
in making general rules and regulations ....
"To its chief executive officer is left the duty of enforcing
such rules and regulations and of the details of administering
these rules and regulations as well as largely of effectuating
the purpose and intent of the state [sic] itself."
39
The Court also stated:

"The powers and duties conferred upon the State Veterinarian... are most important, varied and delicate in their nature,
which can be successfully performed only by one of large experience and knowledge of affairs, and are in a high degree authoritative, discretionary and final in their character. He is the
instrument by and through which such Board functions and the
object, purpose and intent of the act in question effectuated."
The Court rendered the decision in May, 1929. That same month
the Legislature passed a new law that provided for the appointment
4°
of the state veterinarian by the Governor rather than by the board.
Six years later, however, the Legislature passed an act reverting to
the original plan for the selection of the state veterinarian by the State
Livestock Board.41 In an attempt to meet any legal objections, the
Legislature used the term "employment" rather than "appointment."
The statute also stated specifically that all of the veterinarian's powers
38McSween v. State Live Stock Sanitary Board, 97 Fla. 750, 768, 122 So. 239, 246

(1929).
391d. at 772, 122 So. at 246.
4oFla. Laws 1929, c. 13892.
41Fla. Laws 1935, c. 17273.
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and duties should be fixed by the board. During all of this period of
statutory shuffling the state veterinarian continued to exercise approximately the same duties, and if his responsibilities were actually
changed it was not apparent.
Exercise of a Portion of Sovereign Power
The sovereign power principle has been used most frequently by
the Court in characterizing a position as an office or employment. It
stated in State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker that "the term 'office' implies
a delegation of a portion of the sovereign power to . . . the person
filling the office." 42 In 1919, in State ex rel. Holloway v. Sheats,43 the
Court decided that the statutory duty of rural inspectors to visit and
supervise rural schools 44 was not an exercise of a sovereign power.
The statute required that the inspectors work "under the direction
and advice of the State Superintendent of Public Instruction to whom
reports shall be made as required"; thus they would not function independently. In rendering the opinion the Court stated that the most
decisive difference between an employee and an officer is that "an employment does not authorize the exercise in one's own right of any
sovereign power or any prescribed independent authority of a governmental nature .... ,45 The italicized words were probably added to
the "sovereign power" language as explanation rather than as expansion.
The Court in 1920 left no doubt that the sovereign power tests is
fundamental. An office need not have all of the characteristics that
usually distinguish officers from employees: "Some of the minor or
less important ones may be missing and yet the essential one -that
some part of the sovereign power of the State has been delegated to
them or that they exercise distinctly governmental functions be
present."4 6 Thus the act establishing the Florida Purchase Centennial
Commission, 47 which named the members and gave them extensive
powers, including "full and complete power to undertake, inaugurate,
create, perfect, complete, supervise, manage, control, regulate, and
direct an International Exposition," created offices in violation of
42State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker, 39 Fla. 477, 484, 22 So. 721, 722 (1897).
43State ex reL. Holloway v. Sheats, 78 Fla. 583, 83 So. 508 (1919).
44Fla. Laws 1913, c. 6539, §1.
4578 Fla. 583, 588, 83 So. 508, 509 (1919) (emphasis added).
46State ex rel. Swearingen v. Jones, 79 Fla. 56, 59, 84 So. 84, 85 (1920).
47FIa. Laws 1919, c. 7921.
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article III, section 27, of the Constitution. Since 1920 there have been
numerous cases 48 explaining the sovereign power test.
Other Standards
Although the primary characteristic of an officer is his exercise
of sovereign power, additional standards have occasionally been applied by the courts to complement this test.
Continuing and Permanent Duties. The Court in 1893 first relied
49
upon the principle of permanency when it stated:
"It is entirely clear that the three election commissioners [who
had been named specifically] provided for in the act are not
officers within the meaning of Section 27 of Article 3 of the
Constitution, nor are they officers in any sense, but constitute
a temporary board for the performance of certain specified
duties in connection with holding an election authorized by
the Legislature."
In the Hocker case the Court stated that the term "office" embraced
the idea of duration and that the position and duties must remain even
4sCompare Dade County v. State, 95 Fla. 465, 116 So. 72 (1928), in which school
attendance officers were held to be officers, with State ex rel. Holloway v. Sheats,
78 Fla. 583, 83 So. 508 (1919), in which rural school inspectors were adjudged

employees.
In Blitch v. Buchanan, 100 Fla. 1202, 131 So. 151 (1930), the Court held that the
superintendent of the state prison was an employee performing a mandatory act
in causing a murderer's execution; Mr. Justice Ellis concurred in the result but
argued, id. at 1234, 131 So. at 163, "in the awful ceremony of its execution the
state ... gives to each and every act its official sanction of the policy that demands
extermination of a human life .... " Accord, Blackburn v. Brorein, 70 So.2d 293
(Fla. 1954). The Court in the Buchanan case ignored the other statutory duties
of the superintendent, which easily would have supported a holding that he was an
officer.
Mr. Justice Brown concurred in the judgment in State ex rel. Hathaway v.
Williams, 149 Fla. 48, 77, 5 So.2d 269, 280 (1941), and wrote that the director of the
Florida State Employment Service was a "high grade" employee but nevertheless
an employee.
A person who performs duties for one who is admittedly an officer may be an
employee for this reason, regardless of the importance of the duties delegated and
performed. Pace v. King, 38 So.2d 823, 826 (Fla. 1949) (dictum).
49State ex rel. Lamar v. Dillon, 32 Fla. 545, 592, 14 So. 383, 398 (1893).
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though the incumbent dies or is replaced. The Court's statement has
been cited with approval in many cases. 50 The standard of continuity
and permanency was given equal billing with the exercise of sovereign
power principle in holding members of the Board of Control to be
officers. 51 It is evident that temporary positions are not offices; but,
since there are so few positions of this nature, this standard has been
of little value.
Tenure. The Florida Constitution provides that officers cannot
be suspended or removed except for certain causes.52 For this reason
the Supreme Court has declared invalid provisions of laws that provide
for officers to serve at the pleasure of the Governor. 53 The Constitution also provides that the Legislature shall not create any office to
be filled by a term of longer than four years. 54 If no term of office is
mentioned, the Court has said that "it will be presumed that the
Legislature passed the statute with the limitations of Section 7, Article
XVI, in mind, and the statute will be construed as though it provided
for a term of four years." 55
Tenure of office is declared to be one criterion of an office in the
Hocker case and many of the cases following this decision. But it
has been of little importance in arriving at a distinction between an
officer and an employee. In its only explanation of tenure in this context the Court stated that the statutory omission of a definite tenure
for a position does not stamp it as an employment but that this factor
should be considered in construing its status.56
Dignity of the Position. State ex rel. Clyatt v. Hocker states that the
duties of an office should consist of the "exercise of important public
powers."57 Other cases 58 speak of the exercise of "important and deli5OCases cited note 31 supra.
51hn re Advisory Opinion to Governor, 49 Fla. 269, 39 So. 63 (1905).
52FA. CoNsr. art. IV, §15.

53State ex rel. Davis v. Botts, 101 Fla. 361, 134 So. 219 (1931).
54FLA. CoNsr. art. XVI, §7, State ex rel. Landis v. Green, 107 Fla. 355, 144 So.
681 (1932).
5
6 State ex rel. Watson v. Hurlbert, 155 Fla. 531, 535, 20 So.2d 693, 695 (1945).
56Palmer v. State ex rel. Axleroad, 149 Fla. 616, 6 So2d 550 (1942).
5739 Fla. 477, 486, 22 So. 721, 723 (1897).
58E.g., Glendinning v. Curry, 153 Fla. 398, 14 So2d 794 (1943); McSween v. State
Live Stock Sanitary Board, 97 Fla. 750, 122 So. 239 (1929); Dade County v. State, 95
Fla. 465, 116 So. 72 (1928); State ex rel. Swearingen v. Jones, 79 Fla. 56, 84 So. 84

(1920).
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cate" tasks as a standard of determining whether a person is an officer,
but no case has been decided in which this point has been given more
than brief and passing mention. On the other hand, the Court has
held indirectly that importance of the position is not a significant factor: "Some officers are merely clerical or ministerial; but they are useful in enforcing the powers conferred on other officers or tribunals." 59
In a case holding the position of superintendent of nurses to be an
employment the Court stated that "the position of superintendent of
nurses ... though the work it involved was important, did not constitute an office."300
It is doubtful that the factor of importance and dignity of the
position is of any substantial significance in distinguishing between
an officer and an employee. 61
62
Holding of a Commission. The Court in Dade County v. State
declared that "the Constitution does not contemplate that essential
governmental power of authority may be exercised by a corporate
agency whose members are not duly commissioned officers." This
statement was slightly expanded by a later holding that "the Constitution does not contemplate that essential governmental powers or
authority may be exercised by one not a duly commissioned officer." 63
The possession or lack of a commission has never been regarded as
the difference between an officer and an employee. The failure of
the executive secretary of the Everglades National Park Commission
to receive a commission was important when considered with other
circumstances surrounding his appointment and service, but its absence
was not conclusive.6-

Power to Receive Money. This point was made in State ex rel.
Swearingen v. Jones.' 5
"All persons by authority of law intrusted with the receipt of
59State ex reL. Holloway v. Sheats, 78 Fla. 583, 588, 83 So. 508, 509 (1919).
6oGlendinning v. Curry, 153 Fla. 398, 408, 14 So-2d 794, 799 (1943).
G1See note 82 supra.
6295 Fla. 465, 476, 116 So. 72, 76 (1928).
O3Florida Dry Cleaning &Laundry Board v. Economy Cash & Carry Cleaners, Inc.,
143 Fla. 859, 872, 197 So. 550, 556 (1940).
64Palmer v. State ex rel. Axleroad, 149 Fla. 616, 6 So.2d 550 (1942); accord, State
ex rel. Landis v. Bird, 120 Fla. 780, 163 So. 248 (1935); State ex rel. Davis v. Giblin,

98 Fla. 802, 124 So. 375 (1929).
6579

Fla. 56, 63, 84 So. 84, 87 (1920).
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public money, or through whose hands money due to the public
may pass to the treasury, are public officers, whether the service
be general or special, transient or permanent."
This standard was approved in two subsequent cases, 6 but its inconclusiveness was shown by a case holding a parking meter collector
to be an employee. 67 In Blitch v. Buchanans the warden was expressly
commanded by law to have custody of money, but the Court did not
mention this point.
Oath of Office. The Court in 1868 stated, "'Each officer in the
State' . . . is required to take an oath or obligation binding him to
'faithfully perform the duties of the office,'"69 pursuant to the constitutional requirement. 70 The Court, however, has never distinquished
between an officer and an employee solely on the ground of the requirement or lack of requirement of an oath of office. In Palmer v.
State ex rel. Axleroad 71 the Court did affirm the constitutional requirement and stated that "an examination of this testimony is unconvincing that the constitutional requirement was met." 72 This fact
contributed to the declaration by the Court that the executive secretary
of the Everglades National Park Commission was an employee rather
than an officer. Nevertheless, there are many cases in which persons
have been declared officers without a discussion of the presence or
absence of an oath.
The Presumption of Legislative Validity
In State ex rel.Holloway v. Sheats 73 the Court relied to some extent
on the presumption of validity of a statute. 74 The Court recognized
that the members of the Legislature had a knowledge of the constitutional limitation on their creative power and concluded that they did
not intend the rural school inspectors to be officers.
O6Thursby v. Stewart, 103 Fla. 990, 138 So. 742 (1931); Dade County v. State, 95
Fla. 465, 116 So. 72 (1928).
67State ex rel. Dresskell v. Miami, 153 Fla. 90, 13 So2d 707 (1943).
68100 Fla. 1202, 131 So. 151 (1930).
69In re Executive Communication, 12 Fla. 651, 652 (1868).
70oFLA. CONsT. art. XVI, §7.
71149 Fla. 616, 6 So.2d 550 (1942).
.21d. at 620, 6 So.2d at 552.
73State ex rel. Holloway v. Sheats, 78 Fla. 583, 83 So. 508 (1919).
74Fla. Laws 1913, c. 6539.
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In 1939 the Legislature provided for the appointment of probation

deputies by the judges of juvenile courts. 7 5 In an attempt to meet any
objections as to constitutionality, this section was included in the
statute:

7

6

"This act is not intended to create any office or authorize
the appointment or employment of any officer or to delegate
any authority, or duty, or power, or right to exercise... sovereign powers . . . such as can only be legally performed or
exercised by an officer, but is intended to authorize the employment ... under the direction of the Judge of the Juvenile
Court....
The Court nevertheless declared the act invalid, commenting that
the entire act must be considered and that, although the Court realized "the necessity for power in its executive officers if a court is to
function properly and effectively, we cannot agree that such power
can be reposed to that end in a fashion not permitted by the Constitution."77
The strongest statement of presumption of legislative validity came
in 1944 in Ball v. Branch78 The Legislature had passed a special act 79
that combined the public health services of Hillsborough County and
Tampa under a county health unit and provided for an advisory board
with authority to assist in the preparation of the budget for the health
unit. In case of a vacancy in the position of county health officer
the advisory board was to recommend the appointment of a replacement. The constitutionality of the act was questioned because the
members of the advisory board were not appointed by the Governor.
Justice Terrell, in writing the majority opinion, did not cite a
single case. The six-to-one decision rested entirely upon the doctrine of
presumption of legislative validity. The Court gave these reasons
for its decision:8 0
"The act assaulted deals with a question of public policy
75Fa. Laws 1939, c. 19002.
76Id. §11.
77State ex rel. Gibbs v. Martens, 141 Fla. 666, 672, 193 So. 835, 837 (1940).
78154 Fla. 57, 16 So.2d 524 (1944); see also Schott v. Lynch, 57 So.2d 656 (Fla.

1952).
70Fla. Spec. Laws 1943, c. 22323.
80154 Fla. 57, 59, 16 So.2d 524, 525 (1944).
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that was unknown to the makers of the Constitution. Sanitary
engineering, the eradication of preventable diseases, the prevention of communicable diseases, and prophylactic treatment have
all made their appearance in the public health picture since
the adoption of the Constitution and the Legislature should be
accorded a free hand in dealing with them. Since nothing is
more important to the community than the health of the citizenry, constitutional provisions should be liberally construed to
uphold acts designed to protect it."
These cases indicate that the Court places considerable weight on
legislative intent as manifested by the duties assigned to the position
in dispute. But the Court refused to give the presumption of validity
enough weight to hold that all positions filled otherwise than by
gubernatorial appointment or election are automatically employments.8'
CONCLUSION

The most obvious conclusion reached after careful study of the
cases involving the officer-employee controversy is that the distinction
is at best nebulous. One would be most rash to predict a future decision of the Court in this area or how the Legislature might view
the provisions in the Constitution relating to officers. It is of great interest to view the occasional efforts of the Legislature to give important
and responsible powers to individuals not appointed by the Governor
or elected by the people. This is not to say that the legislators necessarily are in error, because it may very well be that the fault lies in the
provisions of the Constitution. Rather than revise or amend the Constitution the Legislature is engaged in great legal gymnastics to make
the 1885 Constitution meet present-day needs as well as conform to
legislative views.
The courts are equally involved in this legal chess game and are
no mere novices, since the records are replete with examples of their
mastery of the art. The primary test applied by the courts of the
officer-employee distinction is that an officer must exercise sovereign
powers. The Florida Court, however, has at times first applied the presumption of legislative validity standard and relegated the exercise
of sovereign power doctrine to a secondary role. At other times, the
8lBlackbum v. Brorein, 70 So.2d 293 (Fla. 1954).
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application of the tests has been reversed. The view of the author is
that the Court should not be criticized on this score but should be
commended for its inconsistency. In both legal theory and practice, a
large number of artificial rules have devolved from precedent, statutes,
and the common law that attempt to provide short cuts for the solution
of complicated problems through the use of mechanistic formulae.
Oftentimes consistency and uniformity in the application of the law
have tended to occupy a preferred place to the accomplishment of
justice.
The Court has shown a tendency to grace law enforcers with the
title "officers," but persons exercising administrative duties have generally not been accorded the same treatment. Thus county game
wardens, probation officers, patrolmen, deputy sheriffs, and the hotel
and restaurant commissioner have been declared officers. On the other
hand, auditors, court reporters, the superintendent of the state prison,
the executive secretary of a commission, the superintendent of nurses,
and the director of the state employment service have been declared
to be employees.
The sovereign power test has become so vague and nebulous that
its use is more the method of expressing an opinion than the application of a legal principle. The entire problem should be left primarily
to legislative direction by application of a stronger presumption of
legislative validity. If the Florida Constitution is revised, serious
consideration should be given to omitting article III, section 27, if
the power of the Governor is maintained in other ways.
Finally, the study of the officer-employee distinction provides an
excellent case study of how the courts, legislatures, and executive agencies interpret, add to, and change the meanings of words and phrases
used in constitutions and statutes. It provides further proof of Judge
Learned Hand's statement that the words a judge - or legislator must construe "are empty vessels into which he can pour anything he
will."

82

82HAND, THE

SPnur

oF LIBERTY 81

(1952).
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